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ABSTRACT 
The majority of casualties in the ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan are 
due to improvised explosive devices (IEDs).  To counter this threat, the Marine Corps 
directed that a persistent surveillance capability be identified and fielded as soon as 
possible.  As a result, the development and fielding of the Ground Based Operational 
Surveillance System (G-BOSS) occurred rapidly.  G-BOSS consists of a tower, multiple 
cameras, and a combat operations center (COC).  Today, scores of these systems are in 
use.  However, minimal guidance has been provided to operators on effective techniques, 
tactics, and procedures (TTPs).  Furthermore, the benefits of adding additional sensors to 
G-BOSS and networking multiple systems are not clear. 
This research investigates these issues through the use of an agent-based 
simulation.  Specifically, thousands of computational experiments, utilizing a  
state-of-the-art experimental design, were run on a scenario based on concurrent live 
developmental tests at 29 Palms by the Marine Corps Operational Test and Evaluation 
Activity (MCOTEA).  The experiments assessed the ability of the system to correctly 
classify objects (e.g., snipers, IED emplacement, and mortar teams, as well as neutrals 
and friendly forces) over a variety of enemy actions, G-BOSS configurations, and tactical 
choices.  The results indicate that the most critical factor in determining the level of 
situational awareness provided by G-BOSS is, by far, placement of the towers.  
Moreover, little benefit is seen in coordinating the towers and COCs unless motion 
detection radars are used.  With use of the motion detection radar, the synchronization of 
multiple systems dramatically enhances the overall performance of G-BOSS. 
vi 
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THESIS DISCLAIMER 
The reader is cautioned that the computer programs presented in this research may 
not have been exercised for all cases of interest.  While every effort has been made, 
within the time available, to ensure that the programs are free of computational and 
logical errors, they cannot be considered validated.  Any application of these programs 
without additional verification is at the risk of the user. 
viii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
ix 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 
A. MOTIVATION ................................................................................................1 
B. THE PROBLEM..............................................................................................3 
C. PURPOSE.........................................................................................................4 
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS.............................................................................5 
E. METHODOLOGY ..........................................................................................5 
F. THESIS ORGANIZATION............................................................................5 
II. MODEL DEVELOPMENT ........................................................................................7 
A. G-BOSS TEST OVERVIEW..........................................................................7 
1. Test Location ........................................................................................8 
2. Test Equipment ....................................................................................9 
3. Test Architecture .................................................................................9 
4. Situational Awareness (SA) Trial .....................................................10 
B. THE MAP AWARE NON-UNIFORM AUTOMATA (MANA) 
COMBAT SIMULATION TOOL................................................................11 
1. Why MANA?......................................................................................12 
C. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SIMULATION MODEL .......................12 
1. Goal .....................................................................................................12 
2. Scale and Terrain...............................................................................13 
3. Agent Descriptions .............................................................................15 
a. The Refueler Agent Class .......................................................15 
4. Red Agents (Hostile Role Players)....................................................15 
a. H-ShovelIED...........................................................................16 
b. H-RifleScope ...........................................................................16 
5. Blue Agents (Friendly Role Players) ................................................17 
a. F-RifleScope............................................................................17 
b. F(Friendlies) ...........................................................................17 
6. Neutral Agents (Neutral Role Players) ............................................17 
a. N(Neutrals)..............................................................................17 
7. Towers 1 and 2 ...................................................................................17 
a. Tower 1 and Tower 2 ..............................................................18 
8. Towers 3 and 4 ...................................................................................18 
a. Tower 3 and Tower 4 ..............................................................18 
9. COC 1 and COC 2 .............................................................................19 
a. COC 1 ......................................................................................19 
b. COC 2 ......................................................................................19 
III. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN.....................................................................................21 
A. MEASURE OF EFFECTIVENESS .............................................................21 
B. EXPERIMENT FACTORS ..........................................................................21 
1. G-BOSS Configuration Factors........................................................22 
a. MSTAR or No MSTAR...........................................................22 
x 
b. Number of COC Monitors ......................................................22 
c. Distance Between Pairs of Towers .........................................22 
2. G-BOSS Performance Factors..........................................................23 
a. Camera 1 P(Classification).....................................................23 
b. Camera 1 Classification Range ..............................................23 
c. Camera 2 P(Classification).....................................................23 
d. Camera 2 Classification Range ..............................................23 
e. Tower Slew Rate......................................................................23 
f. Latency of Communication to COC .......................................23 
g. Reliability of Communication to COC ...................................23 
3. Battle Space Factors ..........................................................................24 
a. Number of Role-players per Team .........................................24 
b. Role-player Stealth..................................................................24 
c. Role-player Speed....................................................................24 
C. NEARLY ORTHOGONAL LATIN HYPERCUBES (NOLH).................24 
IV. DATA ANALYSIS .....................................................................................................27 
A. DATA SUMMARY........................................................................................27 
B. SA CRITICAL FACTORS ...........................................................................28 
1. Stepwise Regression...........................................................................29 
2. Regression Trees ................................................................................35 
C. COC COORDINATION VERSUS STAND-ALONE 
COMPARISONS............................................................................................37 
1. Coordinated versus Stand-Alone Configurations without 
MSTAR ...............................................................................................37 
2. Coordinated versus Stand-alone Configurations with MSTAR....40 
V. CONCLUSIONS ........................................................................................................43 
A. ANALYSIS INSIGHTS.................................................................................43 
B. FOLLOW-ON WORK ..................................................................................44 
LIST OF REFERENCES......................................................................................................45 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .........................................................................................47 
xi 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure ES-1. MANA model screen shot. ........................................................................xx 
Figure 1. G-BOSS operational construct.....................................................................2 
Figure 2. G-BOSS components from l-r:  RAID tower, T-3000, Star SAFIRE IIIFP, 
RGS, MSTAR. (from MCOTEA’s G-BOSS Detailed Assessment Plan, 
April 2008  [Best viewed in color]) .............................................................2 
Figure 3. G-BOSS test site.  (from MCOTEA’s G-BOSS Detailed Assessment Plan, 
April 2008 [Best viewed in color]) ..............................................................8 
Figure 4. MCOTEA test architecture. .........................................................................9 
Figure 5. The elevation and terrain files used by MANA were derived from the 
terrain in the MCOTEA scenario.  [Best viewed in color] ........................14 
Figure 6. The characteristics of the colors in the terrain file for the MANA model 
used in this research. (from MANA 4.01.1) ..............................................15 
Figure 7. MANA Model Screen Shot.  [Best viewed in color] .................................16 
Figure 8. NOLH Design Spreadsheet........................................................................25 
Figure 9. Scatterplot matrix of experiment factors....................................................25 
Figure 10. Experiment factor pairwise correlation matrix. .........................................26 
Figure 11. Data summary for the Mean-Percent-Correct-Identifications MOE.........28 
Figure 12.   Data summary for the Mean-IED-Detected MOE. ..................................28 
Figure 13. Predicted versus actual Mean-Percent-Correct-Identifications and 
associated residual plot verifying the absence of pattern in the residuals. 30 
Figure 14. The R-squared value and significance of the stepwise regression model..30 
Figure 15. Scaled estimates of the preferred stepwise regression used in the study.  
The t-ratio column explains the relationship between the factor and the 
MOE...........................................................................................................32 
Figure 16. Sum of squares of the preferred stepwise regression used in the study.  The 
sum of squares column explains the proportion of variance explained by 
each factor in the stepwise regression model.............................................33 
Figure 17. Interaction plots of four critical factors that determine the level of SA. ...34 
Figure 18. Contour plot of interaction between Tower Slew Rate and Role-player 
Stealth, and their effect on the MOE. ........................................................35 
Figure 19. Regression tree split on the raw data by Mean-Percent-Correct-
Identifications of Correct Identifications. ..................................................36 
Figure 20. Wilcoxon SignedRank Test results for coordinated G-BOSS configuration 
against stand-alone G-BOSS configuration for the Mean-Percent-Correct-
Identification MOE.  (No MSTAR)...........................................................39 
Figure 21. Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test results for coordinated G-BOSS configuration 
against stand-alone G-BOSS configuration for the Mean-IED-Detected 
MOE.   (No MSTAR) ................................................................................40 
Figure 22. Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test results for coordinated G-BOSS configuration 
against stand-alone G-BOSS configuration (with MSTAR). ....................41 
xii 
Figure 23. Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test results for coordinated G-BOSS configuration 
against stand-alone G-BOSS configuration for the Mean-IED-Detected 
MOE.   (With MSTAR) .............................................................................42 
 
xiii 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. Data requirements for MCOTEA’s SA value model. ..................................8 
Table 2. SA test trial role-player categories.............................................................11 
Table 3. Variable factors in the experimental design.  G-BOSS configuration 
factors are in yellow, G-BOSS performance factors are in white, and 
Battle space environment factors are in gray.  [Best viewed in color] ......22 
xiv 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
xv 
LIST OF SYMBOLS, ACRONYMS, AND ABBREVIATIONS 
AOR  Area of Responsibility 
CDD  Capabilities Development Directorate 
CDIB  Capabilities Development Integration Board 
CART  Classification and Regression Tree 
COC  Combat Operations Center  
C2  Command and Control 
C-IED  Counter-Improvised Explosive Devices Technology Directorate 
DTA  Defense Technology Agency 
DCRI  Detection, Classification, Recognition and Identification 
FoS  Family of Systems 
G-BOSS Ground Based Operational Surveillance System 
GCS  Ground Control Station 
GUI  Graphical User Interface 
IED  Improvised Explosive Device 
IDF  Indirect Fire 
ISR  Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance  
JIEDDO Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization 
KIA  Killed in Action 
MSTAR Man-Portable Surveillance and Target Acquisition Radar 
MANA Map Aware Non-Uniform Automata 
MAGTF Marine Air Ground Task Force 
MCOTEA Marine Corps Operational Test and Evaluation Activity 
MCCDC Marine Corps Combat Development Command 
MCISR-E Marine Corps Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance-
Enterprise 
MCSC  Marine Corps Systems Command 
MOE  Measure of Effectiveness 
NGA  National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency 
NPS  Naval Postgraduate School 
NOLH  Nearly Orthogonal Latin Hypercube 
NZDF  New Zealand Defense Force 
OIF  Operation Iraqi Freedom 
RAID  Rapid Aerostat Initial Deployment 
SEED  Simulation Experiments and Efficient Design  
SA  Situational Awareness 
TTP  Tactics, Techniques and Procedures 
UAS  Unmanned Aircraft Systems 
VOIP  Voice Over Internet Protocol  
WIA  Wounded in Action 
xvi 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
xvii 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
First and foremost, I want to thank my beautiful wife Angela.  The quality of my 
thesis is is a direct result of your love, patience, understanding and support.  Words will 
not and can not express the love and gratitude I have for you. 
I want to thank Professor Tom Lucas, Commander Doug Burton, LtCol Sergio 
Posadas and Mary McDonald.  These four incredible people kept me on track and never 
let me lose focus.  Had it not been for their support, this thesis would not have been 
possible.  I appreciate your efforts and I will never forget it.  Last, but not least, I want to 
thank Colonel Ed Lesnowicz, USMC (retired) for his “motivational” pep talks, and 
SEMPER FIDELIS. 
xviii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
xix 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The majority of casualties in the ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan are 
due to improvised explosive devices (IEDs).  To counter this threat, coalition forces have 
directed that a persistent surveillance capability be identified and fielded as soon as 
possible.  As a result, the Ground Based Operational Surveillance System (G-BOSS) was 
developed and fielded.  G-BOSS consists of a tower, multiple cameras, and combat 
operations centers (COCs).  Today, hundreds of these systems are in use.  However, 
minimal guidance has been provided to operators on effective techniques, tactics, and 
procedures (TTPs).  Furthermore, the services are unsure of the benefits of adding 
additional sensors to G-BOSS and networking multiple systems. 
This research provides Coalition forces with analytical support for initial and 
further development of TTPs, modernization efforts, and operational employment for  
G-BOSS.  The analysis is guided by three questions from the Marine Corps Operational 
Test and Evaluation Activity (MCOTEA), who is tasked with testing G-BOSS in order to 
enhance the operational effectiveness of the system.  The questions are: 
• What critical factors determine the level of situational awareness (SA) 
provided by G-BOSS? 
• Does coordination via the COC improve the effectiveness of G-BOSS? 
• Does use of motion detection radar improve the effectiveness of G-BOSS? 
This thesis uses agent-based simulation, state-of-the-art design of experiments, and 
graphical and statistical analysis methods to investigate these questions. 
The goal of the simulation is to measure the level of SA provided by G-BOSS.  
The measures of effectiveness (MOEs) associated with this goal are the proportion of 
correct classifications of friendly, hostile and neutral role players per test trial.  An 
additional MOE is whether or not the IED emplacers were detected.  Factors of interest 
include, but are not limited to:  the slew rate of G-BOSS, the distance between the pairs 
of Rapid Aerostat Initial Deployment (RAID) towers, the configuration of the COCs 
(coordinated or stand-alone), and the presence of Man-Portable Surveillance and Target 
Acquisition Radar (MSTAR) with the G-BOSS sensors. 
xx 
The simulated scenario in this study models a live developmental test conducted 
by the Marine Corps Operational Test and Evaluation Activity (MCOTEA) on the 
capabilities and limitations of G-BOSS conducted in April 2008 in 29 Palms, California.  
The scenario used in this thesis is test trial #15, an IED scenario conducted at night.  Trial 
#15 includes an IED-emplacement team, composed of three hostile role players 
simulating IED emplacement at a predetermined time and location.  The remaining 
neutral, friendly and hostile forces participating in the trial (also consisting of three 
members each) maneuver through the test area while G-BOSS operators use the system 
to determine hostile acts or intent.  Figure ES-1 shows the terrain and agent depictions 
used in the simulation model. 
7
Red Agents are 
Hostile Sniper team 
and/or IED Team
Blue Agents are 
Marines on patrol
Green Agents are 
Neutrals
Purple Agents are 
COC1 / T1 / T2
Yellow Agents are 
COC2 / T3 / T4
  
Figure ES-1. MANA model screen shot. 
Map Aware Non-Uniform Automata (MANA) is the modeling environment used 
in this thesis.  MANA represents the key temporal and spatial elements of this tactical 
scenario and facilitates quickly constructing “medium-resolution” simulations that can be 
broadly explored using sophisticated design of experiments and computing clusters.  
Nearly Orthogonal Latin Hypercubes (NOLHs) and data farming enabled an analysis of a 
large set of possibilities.  The conclusions in the research are based on over twenty  
 
xxi 
thousand simulated tests with varying threats (i.e., snipers and IED emplacement teams) 
neutrals and friendly forces over a variety of enemy actions, G-BOSS configurations, and 
tactical choices. 
The insights gained in this analysis are: 
• The positioning of the towers is the most critical factor associated with 
enhancing the operational effectiveness of G-BOSS.  A distance of 4 km 
between G-BOSS towers results in a proportion of correct identifications 
of 0.91 while a distance of 2 km results in a proportion of 0.53.  When  
G-BOSS is employed in open terrain, more dispersion results in  
better performance. 
• The stealth of the role-players has a significant effect on the proportion of 
correct identifications.  This result is intuitive and helps validate the 
model, since snipers and IED emplacers tend to use stealth to mask their 
hostile acts or intent.  Increased training of G-BOSS operators’ level of 
vigilance is a countermeasure to mitigate enemy stealth. 
• Without the presence of MSTAR, the coordinated G-BOSS configuration 
produces a slightly larger proportion of correct identifications than the 
stand-alone G-BOSS configuration.  The coordinated G-BOSS 
configuration results in an overall proportion of correct identification of 
0.51, while the stand-alone G-BOSS configuration results in an overall 
proportion of correct identification of 0.49.  The results of the comparison 
between the G-BOSS configurations are not practically significant.  This 
is based on the marginal increase of approximately two percentage points 
between the coordinated G-BOSS configuration and the stand-alone G-
BOSS configuration.  Further, this finding answers the question of 
underutilization:  Stand-alone employment of G-BOSS is nearly as 
effective as a coordinated employment of G-BOSS without MSTAR. 
• With MSTAR, the coordinated G-BOSS configuration produces a 
significantly larger proportion of correct identifications than what the 
stand-alone configuration produces.  The coordinated G-BOSS 
configuration results in an overall proportion of correct identifications of 
0.71 and the stand-alone configuration results in an overall proportion of 
correct identifications of 0.47.  This result is practically and statistically 
significant.  MSTAR facilitates the detection of more agents.  MSTAR 
coupled with data fusion at the COC affords commanders an  
enhanced capability. 
• The emplacement of the IED was detected in 76% of all of the simulation 
excursions conducted (which varied 13 factors associated with G-BOSS or 
the role-players).  This is promising since G-BOSS’s mission is to counter 





The improvised explosive device (IED) has proven effective against Marines in 
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).  As a result, the largest number of Marines killed in 
action (KIA) and/or wounded in action (WIA) during OIF is attributed to the IED.  In 
addition to IEDs, insurgents have expanded their range of tactics, techniques, and 
procedures (TTPs) against Marine forces in Iraq with sniper attacks and hit and run 
indirect fire (IDF) teams.  The potential to cause high-density, melodramatic attacks to 
test the resolve of our nation in fighting the Global War on Terror is the central value of 
the IED to insurgents. 
In an attempt to mitigate further casualties by these popular tactics, the 
Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC), Capabilities Development 
Directorate (CDD), and Capabilities Development Integration Board (CDIB), under the 
guidance of the Marine Corps’ Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) 
strategy, directed that a persistent surveillance capability be identified and fielded 
immediately.  The ISR strategy is a component of the Marine Corps ISR-Enterprise 
(MCISR-E), whose focus is to integrate air, ground, and space sensors into a network 
capable of detecting, locating, identifying, and targeting threats. 
The Ground-Based Operational Surveillance System (G-BOSS)—the focus of this 
thesis—is one system within a larger Family of Systems (FoS) predicated on the concept 






















CURRENT OPERATIONS FUTURE OPERATIONS 
 
Figure 1. G-BOSS operational construct. 
G-BOSS is a force protection, camera-oriented, day/night, expeditionary tool that 
provides the ability to detect, track, display, record, assess, deny, and store video to 
counter the threat of IEDs and disrupt insurgency activities (Marine Corps Combat 
Development Command, 2007) as shown in Figure 1, the G-BOSS operational construct.  
G-BOSS referred to throughout this analysis is composed of a Rapid Aerostat Initial 
Deployment (RAID) 107-foot mobile tower, two cameras:  a Star SAFIRE IIIFP and a  
T-3000, a Man-Portable Surveillance and Target Acquisition Radar (MSTAR) sensor, 
and a Ground Control Station (GCS). 
 
Figure 2. G-BOSS components from l-r:  RAID tower, T-3000, Star SAFIRE IIIFP, 
RGS, MSTAR. (from MCOTEA’s G-BOSS Detailed Assessment Plan, April 2008  
[Best viewed in color]) 
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B. THE PROBLEM 
 The objective for G-BOSS is to detect, identify, and track insurgent activities; 
specifically those associated with the emplacement of IEDs.  Since its initial employment 
in late spring 2007, G-BOSS has contributed to the reduction of the loss of life among 
Marine forces due to IEDs.  One potential end-state is a fully networked G-BOSS capable 
of integration with unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), command and control (C2) assets, 
and fire support systems that will increase situational awareness (SA) and aid 
commanders in conducting current and future offensive operations to disrupt  
insurgent activity. 
G-BOSS is currently deployed in a stand-alone configuration with minimal 
centralized coordination and consolidation of sensor data.  Employment of G-BOSS in a 
stand-alone configuration is not due to fault, nor negligence.  The immediate need for G-
BOSS, coupled with an aggressive implementation of the system in theater, did not afford 
time to develop TTPs for G-BOSS.  The Marine Corps has a four-phase employment plan 
for G-BOSS.  The Marine Corps is in phase two of its four-phase employment of G-
BOSS.  The phases are: 
– Phase 1 
• Manual operation 
• View video at base of each tower 
• Radio communication to a combat operations center (COC) 
– Phase 2 
• Manual operation 
• Video feed to COC 
• COC directs camera slewing 
– Phase 3 
• Cameras controlled from COC 
• Automatic camera slewing 
– Phase 4 
• Integrated network throughout province (multiple COCs) 
4 
The Marine Corps Systems Command (MCSC), Counter-Improvised Explosive 
Devices Technology Directorate (C-IED) wants to know if the G-BOSS employment 
approach in Phase 2 provides more SA than the G-BOSS employment approach in  
Phase 1.  This thesis addresses the question:  How can Marines deployed now best 
employ G-BOSS?  The Marine Corps Operational Test and Evaluation Activity 
(MCOTEA) conducted a developmental test of G-BOSS to evaluate the capabilities and 
limitations of the system, in order to enhance its operational effectiveness for deployed 
commanders.  Results from this test are intended to improve the phased deployment  
of G-BOSS. 
C. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this thesis is to develop a simulation using an agent-based model 
(ABM) that represents the live developmental test conducted by MCOTEA.  The goal is 
to provide coalition forces with analytical support to improve G-BOSS TTPs and enhance 
the operational effectiveness of the system.  The simulated operational experience 
provided by this analysis helps facilitate future tests of G-BOSS capabilities and can 
potentially serve as an operational planning tool for commanders. 
Further, this study serves as a proof of concept of the capability that the 
Simulation Experiments and Efficient Design (SEED) Center for Data Farming at the 
Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) can provide to support the Joint Improvised Explosive 
Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) in the war against IEDs.  The SEED Center for 
Data Farming mission statement is to “advance the collaborative development and use of 
simulation experiments and efficient designs to provide decision makers with timely 
insights on complex systems and operations.”  JIEDDO has the mission to “lead, 
advocate, and coordinate all Department of Defense actions in support of Combatant 
Commanders’ and their respective Joint Task Forces’ efforts to defeat improvised 
explosive devices as weapons of strategic influence.”  The SEED Center 
(http://harvest.nps.edu) and JIEDDO (https://www.jieddo.dod.mil/) websites provide 
more detail. 
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D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis simulates MCOTEA’s live test and conducts a comparative, 
quantitative analysis of G-BOSS employment TTPs to enhance the operational 
effectiveness of G-BOSS.  While this analysis is by no means exhaustive, the following 
questions are addressed: 
• What critical factors determine the level of SA provided by G-BOSS? 
• Does coordination via the COC improve the effectiveness of G-BOSS? 
• Does use of motion detection radar improve the effectiveness of G-BOSS? 
E. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis uses agent-based simulation, state-of-the-art design of experiments, 
and advanced data analysis methods to analyze the critical factors associated with the 
level of SA provided by G-BOSS.  The process is to simulate a scenario based on a live 
developmental test conducted by MCOTEA with G-BOSS.  The simulated model is then 
replicated and analyzed.  The analysis process uses a technique called data farming, 
which involves using high-performance computing to run the simulation thousands of 
times, while simultaneously varying many input parameters.  As a result, data farming 
provides insights into complex problems through the exploration of a multitude of 
possible outcomes. 
This thesis uses an agent-based distillation, which is a type of computer 
simulation that attempts to capture the critical factors of interest in combat without 
explicitly modeling all of the physical details.  The tool used is Map Aware Non-Uniform 
Automata (MANA), developed by the New Zealand Defense Technology Agency (DTA).  
More information about MANA can be found at https://teams.nzdf.mil.nz/sites/mana/ 
default.aspx. 
F. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
Chapter II begins with an unclassified description of the equipment and the 
scenario involved with MCOTEA’s test.  The chapter concludes with an overview of 
6 
MANA and a detailed description of the simulation model created for this thesis.  
Chapter III offers a discussion on the design of experiments used for this analysis and 
includes a description of the factors used in this analysis, and an explanation of  
Nearly Orthogonal Latin Hypercubes (NOLHs).  Chapter IV provides a description of the 
analytical methods used to interpret the results of the simulated tests and concludes with 
an explanation of the analytical results.  Chapter V completes the thesis with a discussion 
of the insights gained from the analysis and recommends topics for  
follow-on research. 
7 
II. MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
Persistent surveillance is the primary capability afforded to the commander by  
G-BOSS.  Under the guidance of the Marine Corps’ ISR strategy, G-BOSS will be 
employed at all levels of the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) to perform 
surveillance of assigned areas of responsibility (AOR).  G-BOSS is now employed in a 
stand-alone configuration.  MCSC wants to know if current employment techniques 
underutilize G-BOSS.  MCOTEA’s test of G-BOSS addresses that question. 
A. G-BOSS TEST OVERVIEW 
MCOTEA’s developmental test of G-BOSS evaluates its capabilities and 
limitations.  Their assessment included three distinct test events:  SA; Detection, 
Classification, Recognition, and Identification (DCRI); and Track Error.  The scenario 
and simulation model developed for use in this thesis depicts one night time test trial of 
the SA test event.  The SA test event explores whether a coordinated network approach of 
G-BOSS significantly improves SA over the current uncoordinated, stand-alone  
tower approach. 
MCOTEA measures SA and compares the level of SA between a coordinated and 
stand-alone tower approach in two steps.  First, test trials that use role players in teams of 
friendly, hostile and neutral personnel to maneuver at varying ranges within G-BOSS’s 
field-of-regard.  The G-BOSS operators use the system and determine hostile acts or 
intent.  The second part is to calculate an SA score based on an SA Value Model 
developed by MCOTEA.  Table 1 lists the data requirements necessary to calculate the 
SA score.  To learn more about the MCOTEA Situational Awareness Value Model, 
contact MCOTEA at www.quantico.usmc.mil/activities/?Section=MCOTEA for a copy 
of the report detailing the results of the developmental test for G-BOSS. 
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MCOTEA Test Data Requirements 
Trial Number Percent of Hostiles Identified 
Trial Time Percent of Neutral Identified 
Data Collector Percent of Friendly Identified 
Configuration Percent of Identification | Detection 
MSTAR Percent of Detections 
Enemy Action Percent of False Detections 
Lux Target Location Error 
Temperature Screen Clutter 
Humidity Current Target Location Error 
Wind Speed Percent of Hostiles Identified Pre-Act 
Pressure False Alarm Rate for Hostiles 
Probability of Identification | Cue Time to Respond to Cue 
Table 1.   Data requirements for MCOTEA’s SA value model. 
1. Test Location 
 The test was conducted at Acorn Range, Marine Corps Air Ground Combat 
Center, 29 Palms, California, from 15-28 April 2008.  In Figure 3, the red colored area 
depicts the zone in which teams of role players maneuvered against G-BOSS during the 
SA test event. 
 
 
Figure 3. G-BOSS test site.  (from MCOTEA’s G-BOSS Detailed Assessment Plan, 
April 2008 [Best viewed in color]) 
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2. Test Equipment 
Due to the classified nature of the exact specifications and capabilities of  
G-BOSS, only a general description is provided.  Figure 2, in Chapter I, illustrates  
G-BOSS undergoing test and evaluation.  The Star SAFIRE IIIFP and T-3000 cameras 
are mounted at the top of the RAID tower.  A tactical radio for the transmission of 
camera and radar data is mounted near the cameras.  MSTAR is mounted on the tower, 
approximately 28 feet above the tower’s base.  MCOTEA assessed (4) RAID towers,  
(8) cameras, (4) MSTARs, (4) GCSs, (2) RGSs, and (2) COCs. 
3. Test Architecture 
 Figure 4 shows the test equipment configuration:  four RAID 107-foot towers, 
each configured with one Star SAFIRE IIIFP camera and one T-3000 camera.  The  
G-BOSS sensors were deployed in two distinct configurations:  a coordinated network 
configuration and an uncoordinated, stand-alone configuration.  Each tower pair (1 and 2, 
3 and 4) spans a 2-km distance.  For administrative and logistical convenience, tower 
pairs were located near each other.  COC 1 and COC 2 are located approximately 50 km 
away from their respective towers. 
 COC 1 COC 2 
T1 T3 T2 T4 
T1 – T2 = 2 km
T3 – T4 = 2 km
 
Figure 4. MCOTEA test architecture. 
Towers 1 and 2, along with COC 1, were operated in a coordinated network 
configuration.  The coordinated network approach allows COC 1 to optimize the search 
patterns of the four G-BOSS sensors on Towers 1 and 2.  Under this configuration,  
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COC 1 is able to assist Towers 1 and 2 assess hostile acts or intent during the test trial.  
COC 1 is able to assist Towers 1 and 2, since it can observe what all four G-BOSS 
sensors on Towers 1 and 2 can observe. 
Towers 3 and 4, along with COC 2, were operated in an uncoordinated,  
stand-alone configuration.  This configuration allows degraded assistance from COC 2 to 
Towers 3 and 4 during the test trial to assess hostile acts or intent.  COC 2 could not 
observe what Towers 3 and 4 could see, but received updates via voice over internet 
protocol (VOIP) phone transmission. 
4. Situational Awareness (SA) Trial 
An SA trial consisted of a predetermined time period wherein a mix of friendly, 
neutral and hostile role players operated on foot in the field of view of the G-BOSS 
towers.  During this period, some of the hostile role players performed their mission.  A 
trial period starts at either the beginning of a test day or at the end of the previous data 
collection stop.  A trial period ends at a predetermined time for a data collection stop.  
The two distinct tower and COC configurations operate simultaneously during the trial, 
so, at a minimum, each data collection stop yields two trials. 
The SA trial associated with this thesis was test trial #15, which was an IED 
scenario conducted on 24 April 2008 at night.  The scenario included an  
IED-emplacement team, composed of three hostile role players simulating IED 
emplacement at a predetermined time and location.  The remaining neutral, friendly and 
hostile forces participating in the trial (also consisting of three members each) moved 
through the test area as directed by the test-trial script.  The trial concluded upon 
completion of the hostile act and after MCOTEA called for a data collection stop.   
G-BOSS operators were provided a table, such as Table 2, to facilitate distinguishing 
between role players. 
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Role Player Category Code Distinguishing Features 
N Middle Eastern Clothing 
N-Shovel Middle Eastern Clothing w/Shovel 
Neutral 
(N) 
N-Rifle Middle Eastern Clothing w/Rifle 
   
F-Mortar Helmet/Flak w/Mortar Tube 
F-Rifle/Scope Helmet/Flak w/Rifle/Scope 




   
H-Shovel/IED Middle Eastern Clothing w/Shovel/IED 
H-Rifle/Scope Middle Eastern Clothing w/Rifle/Scope 
Hostile 
(H) 
H-Mortar Middle Eastern Clothing w/Mortar Tube 
Table 2.   SA test trial role-player categories. 
B. THE MAP AWARE NON-UNIFORM AUTOMATA (MANA) COMBAT 
SIMULATION TOOL 
 MANA is the modeling environment used in this thesis.  MANA is a time-step, 
ABM environment developed by the New Zealand DTA in early 2000 for the  
New Zealand Defense Force (NZDF) after experiencing frustration with combat models 
based solely on physics.  MANA intends to capture “enough physics as is necessary” 
(McIntosh, Galligan, Anderson, & Lauren, 2007), to capture aspects of human behavior 
and to represent a wide range of interactions among agents and their environment.  In a 
MANA model, the agents are: 
• Map Aware—Agents have SA of the other agents and terrain that is 
updated by sensors and communications. 
• Non-uniform—Individual agents may have different behavior parameters, 
capabilities, sensors, weapons, and communications. 
• Automata—Agents react independently on the battlefield according to 
their own individual characteristics and awareness. 
MANA is a straightforward application that is intuitive and easy to use with a  
well-developed Graphical User Interface (GUI).  More details of this model are readily 
available in the MANA User’s Manual and at https://teams.nzdf.mil.nz/sites/mana/ 
default.aspx. 
12 
1. Why MANA? 
 Many aspects of warfare can be explained by physics, such as the trajectory of a 
projectile to a point of impact or the effective casualty radius of an artillery round.  Less 
tangible elements, such as SA, must also be explained or measured.  The nonlinear 
relationships associated with SA, coupled with the numerous variables involved, make 
sole dependence on physics-based models ineffective. 
MANA represents the key temporal and spatial elements of the tactical scenario.  
With a clear idea of this scenario and the measure in question, MANA can provide the 
capability to “explore the greatest range of possible outcomes with the least set-up time” 
(McIntosh, Galligan, Anderson, & Lauren, 2007). 
 MANA is used because SA is the primary measure to be analyzed.  In the most 
basic of terms, “SA is knowing what is going on around you” (Endsley & Garland, 2000).  
Many factors influence the various levels of SA.  MANA provides a dynamic and 
stochastic environment in which many of these factors can be varied and their 
interactions explored.  MANA also facilitates rapid scenario generation based on 
MCOTEA’s developmental test. 
C. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SIMULATION MODEL 
The role players and equipment associated with the SA test trial are referred to as 
agents.  An agent is a “character” within the MANA modeling environment with assigned 
attributes and personality characteristics similar to their actual capabilities. 
Detection is defined as one agent being aware of another agent’s presence.  
Classification is a step further.  Classification means an agent is able to distinguish if a 
detected agent is a neutral, hostile or friendly agent.  In the MCOTEA test, detection 
takes on the same definition as in the MANA scenario.  Identification in the MCOTEA 
test is the equivalent to classification in the MANA scenario. 
1. Goal 
 The goal of the simulation is to measure the level of SA provided by G-BOSS for 
test trial #15.  The measures of effectiveness (MOEs) associated with this goal are the 
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proportion of correct classifications of friendly, hostile and neutral role players per test 
trial.  An additional MOE is whether or not the IED emplacers were detected.  Factors of 
interest include, but are not limited to:  the slew rate of G-BOSS, the distance between 
the pairs of RAID towers, the configuration of the COCs (coordinated or stand-alone), 
and the presence of MSTAR with the G-BOSS sensors. 
2. Scale and Terrain 
The implementation of the scenario in MANA requires mapping from real time 
and real space to simulated time and simulated space.  In this simulation model, a time 
step is equal to 5 seconds of real time.  For a 1-hour scenario this equates to 720 model 
time steps.  The default battlefield size for a scenario in MANA is a 200 x 200 grid.  The 
scale of the scenario used in the simulation model is 20 meters per grid square.  Thus, a 
650 pixel by 500 pixel map grid represents the 13 kilometer by 10 kilometer test area 
used in the MCOTEA test.  Due to the few agents needed for the simulation, a 1-hour 
simulated test trial completes in approximately 30 seconds of real time per execution on a 
standard laptop processor.  The time and distance scales were chosen to achieve “good 
enough” resolution to simulate and record the result of agent activities. 
 The terrain in the model consists of two components:  an elevation map and a 
terrain map as shown in Figure 5.  In the elevation map, black represents the lowest level 
of elevation and white represents the highest elevation.  Elevation in MANA is used to 
block line-of-sight, as appropriate.  To obtain the elevation map, the Falcon View 
software package was used to open the appropriate DTED-2 file that was obtained from 
the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA).  The image file acquired with 
Falcon View was then translated into a bitmap that could be read in by MANA.  Finally, 
within MANA, the user manually enters the difference between high and low points in 






Terrain from MCOTEA’s Test
 
Figure 5. The elevation and terrain files used by MANA were derived from the 
terrain in the MCOTEA scenario.  [Best viewed in color] 
 
The terrain file depicts battlefield terrain in the model.  Distinct colors are used to 
represent terrain features within the model.  Figure 6 shows how colored pixels on the 
terrain map (as defined by their Red-Green-Blue settings) affect the movement speed of 
the role-players.  Figure 6 also shows the level of cover and concealment provided by the 
terrain.  For example, a terrain type created for this scenario called defilade, which is 
depicted by the brown spots in the MANA terrain file, allows only 70% of the maximum 
speed for a role-player, 10% protection from fire, and 60% concealment from view.  
These percentages are used as multipliers in MANA’s calculations, and their use is 
further described in the MANA User’s Manual. 
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Figure 6. The characteristics of the colors in the terrain file for the MANA model 
used in this research. (from MANA 4.01.1) 
3. Agent Descriptions 
a. The Refueler Agent Class 
A large portion of the test trial depends upon the agent’s stealth as it 
maneuvers in the test area.  To facilitate stealth, an agent named “Refueler” was created 
to serve the purpose of “refueling” the role-player agents in the scenario, according to its 
range and probability settings.  Receiving fuel from the refueler triggers the agent to 
temporarily go into a stealth state where it stops moving for 12 time steps (1 minute).  
The refueler agent is invisible to other agents and provides fuel every 36 time steps  
(3 minutes) on average. 
4. Red Agents (Hostile Role Players) 
SA test trial #15 uses two types of hostile role-players:  an IED emplacer and a 
sniper.  These agents are referred to as H-ShovelIED and H-RifleScope, respectively. 
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a. H-ShovelIED 
This agent is depicted by a standing red soldier icon on the screenshot 
shown in Figure 7.  This agent moves slowly and stealthily, while seeking defilade 
positions, until it arrives at the IED emplacement location.  During its hostile act, its 
appearance changes into a larger red soldier icon.  The simulated hostile act takes place at 
approximately time step 360 (30 minutes into the scenario, in accordance with the live 
test event).  The act continues for approximately 120 time steps (10 minutes).  During the 
simulated hostile act, the agent loses the stealth property because it is digging.  When it is 




Red Agents are 
Hostile Sniper team 
and/or IED Team
Blue Agents are 
Marines on patrol
Green Agents are 
Neutrals
Purple Agents are 
COC1 / T1 / T2
Yellow Agents are 
COC2 / T3 / T4
 
Figure 7. MANA Model Screen Shot.  [Best viewed in color] 
b. H-RifleScope 
This agent is depicted by a red soldier icon in the prone position on the 
screenshot shown in Figure 7.  This agent moves slowly and stealthily seeking cover and 
concealment from defilade to its final hide position.  When it is refueled by the Refueler, 
this agent stops moving and employs stealth for 12 time steps (1 minute). 
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5. Blue Agents (Friendly Role Players) 
SA test trial #15 uses two types of friendly role-players:  a Marine with a rifle and 
a scope and a Marine with just a rifle.  These agents are referred to as  
F-RifleScope and F(Friendlies), respectively. 
a. F-RifleScope 
This agent is depicted by a standing blue soldier icon on the screenshot 
shown in Figure 7.  This agent moves slowly and stealthily seeking cover and 
concealment from defilade to its final hide position.  When refueled by the Refueler, this 
agent stops moving and employs stealth for 12 time steps (1 minute). 
b. F(Friendlies) 
This agent is depicted by a standing blue soldier icon on the screenshot 
shown in Figure 7.  This agent moves slowly and stealthily seeking cover and 
concealment from defilade to its final hide position.  When refueled by the Refueler, this 
agent stops moving and employs stealth for 12 time steps (1 minute). 
6. Neutral Agents (Neutral Role Players) 
SA test trial #15 uses one type of friendly role-player:  a local member of the area.  
This agent is known as N(Neutrals). 
a. N(Neutrals) 
This agent is depicted by a standing green soldier icon on the screenshot 
shown in Figure 7.  This agent maneuvers in the test area without seeking cover and 
concealment.  This agent does not turn yellow since there is no need for it to be stealthy.  
This agent simply wanders about the test area. 
7. Towers 1 and 2 
SA test trial #15 uses two towers with the traits listed below.  These agents are 
referred to as Tower 1 and Tower 2. 
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a. Tower 1 and Tower 2 
These agents are depicted by purple tower icons on the screenshot shown 
in Figure 7.  These agents do not move.  They detect and classify other agents in the test 
area with their three sensors, T-3000, StarSAFIRE IIIFP, and MSTAR.  The agents 
continually scan the test area to classify other agents, and once the tower classifies 
another agent in the test area, the tower “shoots” a round from its perfectly lethal, 
perfectly accurate weapon.  In the model, shooting/killing is a surrogate for classifying.  
This is done to simplify the MOE data collection.  This approach is reasonable since 
combat adjudication is not employed. At least three discrete time observations  
(15 seconds of observation or shots) are required to classify an agent. 
Towers 1 and 2 along with COC 1 represent the coordinated network 
configuration described in the test architecture.  To model that configuration, all 
classification information is passed instantaneously and accurately to COC 1.  This 
approach simulates four monitors, one for each view of each tower’s cameras, in COC 1. 
8. Towers 3 and 4 
SA test trial #15 uses two towers with the same traits.  These agents are known as 
Tower 3 and Tower 4. 
a. Tower 3 and Tower 4 
These agents are depicted by purple tower icons on the screenshot shown 
in Figure 7.  These agents do not move.  They detect and classify other agents in the test 
area with their three sensors, T-3000, StarSAFIRE IIIFP, and MSTAR.  The agents 
continually scan the test area to classify other agents, and once the tower classifies 
another agent in the test area, the tower “shoots” a round from its perfectly lethal, 
perfectly accurate weapon.  In the model, shooting/killing is a surrogate for classifying.  
This is done to simplify the MOE data collection.  This approach is reasonable since 
combat adjudication is not employed. At least three discrete time observations (or shots) 
are required to classify an agent. 
Towers 3 and 4 along with COC 2 represent the stand-alone network 
configuration described in the test architecture.  To model that configuration, the Towers 
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attempt to pass all classification information to COC 2; however, with delays and 
inaccuracies.  Only one message at a time is passed.  This technique simulates the  
G-BOSS limitation of only monitoring one threat at a time. 
9. COC 1 and COC 2 
SA test trial #15 uses two COCs with different traits.  These agents are called 
COC 1 and COC 2. 
a. COC 1 
This agent is depicted by a purple crosshair icon on the screenshot shown 
in Figure 7.  This agent does not move and has no organic sensor associated with it.   
COC 1 receives classification information from Towers 1 and 2, in a manner that 
simulates two monitors associated with each tower’s cameras.  COC 1 performs data 
fusion on the information received from Towers 1 and 2 to assist the towers with 
classification of agents.  For more detail on MANA data fusion, the MANA User’s 
Manual may be consulted.  The data fusion capability is used as a surrogate to model the 
effect of the COC operators assisting with the classification task.  COC classification is 
accomplished in the same manner as classification by a tower. 
b. COC 2 
This agent is depicted by a yellow crosshair icon on the screenshot shown 
in Figure 7.  COC 2 operates in a similar manner to COC 1.  COC 2 receives less 
information from Towers 3 and 4.  Only completed classifications are passed from 
Towers 3 and 4 to COC 2.  COC 2 does not employ data fusion. 
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III. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
A goal of this thesis is to provide insights that enhance the operational 
effectiveness of G-BOSS.  Experimental design is used to identify the critical factors 
associated with the level of SA provided by G-BOSS.  The experimental design includes 
selection of factors and measures of effectiveness (MOEs).  State-of-the-art techniques 
are applied to efficiently explore the parameter space through data farming.  NOLHs 
facilitate this approach. 
A. MEASURE OF EFFECTIVENESS 
 A MOE is “a measure of operational success that must be closely related to the 
objective of the mission or operation being evaluated.  A meaningful MOE must be 
quantifiable and a measure to what degree the real objective is achieved” (The Defense 
Acquisition University [DAU], 2003).  SA is the intangible measure in the center of this 
analysis.  A simple definition of SA is “knowing what is going on around you” (Endsley 
& Garland, 2000).  SA also includes observing the battlespace, processing input from 
those observations and developing an understanding of the environment, friendly actions 
and threat activity.  Two MOEs are used to quantify SA in this analysis:  the percent of 
correct classifications made by G-BOSS operators and whether or not an IED 
emplacement is observed. 
B. EXPERIMENT FACTORS 
 The simulation factors chosen for this thesis are based on the developmental test 
conducted by MCOTEA on G-BOSS.  The experiment factors are grouped into three 
categories:  G-BOSS configuration, G-BOSS performance, and battlespace environment.  
G-BOSS configuration and G-BOSS performance factors can be controlled in the real 
world by the decision maker.  For example, the distance between each G-BOSS RAID 
tower is dictated by the COC.  Battlespace environment factors cannot be controlled in 
the real world by the decision maker.  Examples include the number of hostile, friendly, 
or neutral personnel in a G-BOSS field-of-regard.  Table 3 summarizes the simulation 
parameters and their ranges used in the experiment. 
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Factor Value Range Explanation 
MSTAR / No MSTAR 0 or 1 With or without motion detection radar 
Number of COC Monitors 0, 1, 2 Number of monitors per COC  
Distance Between Pairs of  
Towers 2km, 4km Distance between RAID towers 
Cam 1 P(Class) .01….99 Probability of classification associated with the T-3000 sensor 
Cam 1 Class Range +/- 20% Probability of classification range associated with the T-3000 sensor 
Cam 2 P(Class) .01….99 Probability of classification associated  with the Star SAFIRE IIIFP sensor 
Cam 2 Class Range +/- 20% Probability of classification range associated with the Star SAFIRE IIIFP sensor 
Tower Slew Rate 1 - 3 deg/ts Surrogate for time it takes to cover the area in high-resolution mode  
Latency of Comm to COC 1 min… 15 min 
Delay associated with passing contact info from tower to 
COC 
Reliability of Comm to COC .01….99 Probability that intended message from tower is received by COC 
Number of Role-players per 
Team 2 … 6 Number of role-players per team  
Role-player Stealth  .01….99 Level of stealth associated with each role-player 
Role-player Speed .5 km/hr to 2 km/hr Maneuver speed for each role-player 
Table 3.   Variable factors in the experimental design.  G-BOSS configuration factors are in 
yellow, G-BOSS performance factors are in white, and Battle space environment 
factors are in gray.  [Best viewed in color] 
1. G-BOSS Configuration Factors 
The following factors are used to analyze the level of SA provided  
by G-BOSS: 
a. MSTAR or No MSTAR 
This is a categorical variable defined by whether the motion detection 
radar is present or not. 
b. Number of COC Monitors 
This is the number of monitors in the COC. 
c. Distance Between Pairs of Towers 
This is the distance between RAID towers. 
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2. G-BOSS Performance Factors 
The following factors are used to analyze the level of SA provided by  
G-BOSS on a basis of performance: 
a. Camera 1 P(Classification) 
This is the probability of classification associated with the T-3000 sensor. 
b. Camera 1 Classification Range 
This is the probability of classification range associated with the  
T-3000 sensor. 
c. Camera 2 P(Classification) 
This is the probability of classification associated with the Star SAFIRE 
IIIFP sensor. 
d. Camera 2 Classification Range 
This is the probability of classification range associated with the Star 
SAFIRE IIIFP sensor. 
e. Tower Slew Rate 
This is a surrogate for time it takes to cover the area in  
high-resolution mode. 
f. Latency of Communication to COC 
This is the delay associated with passing contact information from the 
tower to the COC. 
g. Reliability of Communication to COC 




3. Battle Space Factors 
The following factors were chosen to analyze the level of SA provided by G-
BOSS, based on elements of the battlefield that are uncontrollable: 
a. Number of Role-players per Team 
This is the number of role-players per team. 
b. Role-player Stealth 
This is the level of stealth associated with each role-player. 
c. Role-player Speed  
This is maneuver speed for each role-player. 
C. NEARLY ORTHOGONAL LATIN HYPERCUBES (NOLH) 
 NOLHs are a space-filling experimental design technique developed by  
COL Thomas Cioppa, United States Army, at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) in 
2002.  This technique allows for the exploration of a large number of input parameters in 
an efficient number of runs, while maintaining nearly orthogonal design columns (Cioppa 
& Lucas, 2007).  A design of 13 factors at just two levels, each using a full-factorial 
approach, would require nearly a quarter of a million runs (8,192 design points x 30 reps 
= 245,760 total runs).  Using a crossed design with a stacked NOLH for the quantitative 
factors, the number of runs is reduced significantly to 23,760 (792 design points x 30 reps 
= 23,760) runs and the quantitative factors are more extensively varied.  Figure 8 shows 
the NOLH design spreadsheet used for this analysis and Figure 9 shows the space-filling 
property of the NOLH technique. 
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Figure 9. Scatterplot matrix of experiment factors. 
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Another advantage of NOLH is the negligible correlation among experiment 
factors, which prevents factor effects being confounded with one another.  Figure 10 
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Figure 10. Experiment factor pairwise correlation matrix. 
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IV. DATA ANALYSIS 
After defining the problem, scenario, MOEs and experimental design, the 
simulation is executed to generate output data.  The next task is the analysis of the data 
generated by data farming the simulation model.  The analysis provided in this chapter is 
the result of an iterative and exhaustive process of applying various statistical techniques 
to the simulation output.  Not every step of that exhaustive process is detailed in this 
section.  Models and techniques resulting in significant findings about G-BOSS 
operational effectiveness are included in this chapter.  JMP Statistical Discovery 
Software Version 7 is the primary tool used for this analysis. Details of this data analysis 
software are readily available at www.jmp.com.  
The analysis evaluates three specific research questions about enhancing the 
operational effectiveness of G-BOSS: 
• What critical factors determine the level of SA provided by G-BOSS? 
• Does coordination via the COC improve the effectiveness of G-BOSS? 
• Does use of motion detection radar improve the effectiveness of G-BOSS? 
Each question is addressed in this chapter, along with an explanation of the analysis 
technique and results. 
A. DATA SUMMARY 
A summary of the MOE data is provided in Figures 10 and 11.  For clarity of 
presentation, the means of the 780 design points are graphed.  The data summary includes 
the distribution data and 95% confidence intervals for the MOEs.  Based on the 
distribution of the Mean-IED-Detected MOE, the IED emplacement was detected 76% of 
the time.  The Mean-Percent-Correct-Identifications MOE distribution data shows  
G-BOSS provides an average of 72% correct identifications in SA trial #15.  Neither 
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Figure 12.   Data summary for the Mean-IED-Detected MOE. 
B. SA CRITICAL FACTORS 
Stepwise Regression and Classification and Regression Trees (CART) are the 
primary data analysis techniques used to identify the critical factors and interactions that 
determine the level of SA provided by G-BOSS in this scenario. 
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1. Stepwise Regression 
Regression is a common statistical technique used for investigating the effects of 
factors on a response variable (Montgomery, Peck, & Vining, 2006) or MOE.  This 
technique is computationally intensive and allows the possibility to overfit a model.  
Stepwise regression reduces the parameter space to only those factors with a specified 
significance level by incrementally adding and deleting factors to the regression model.  
The result of a stepwise regression identifies the significant or critical factors that affect 
the response or MOE.  Further, stepwise regression provides parameter estimates for the 
significant factors that result in the most preferred R-squared value.  By definition, the  
R-squared value is the explained proportion of the variation in the response from fitting 
the model to the input values (Montgomery et al., 2006). 
The initial stepwise regression model for this study investigated all main effects 
and two-way interaction terms of the 13 experimental factors on the Mean-Percent-
Correct-Identifications MOE as the response variable.  A 0.05 level of significance is 
used in the development of this model.  The results identified the most critical factors.  
Thus, the preferred regression model used in this study includes these seven critical 
factors and some of their interactions: 
• Distance Between Pairs of Towers 
• Number of Role-players per Team 
• Role-player Speed 
• Tower Slew Rate 
• Number of COC Monitors 
• MSTAR/no MSTAR 
• Role-player Stealth 
Figure 13 is a visual representation of the preferred model.  The plot of the actual 
versus predicted response displays how closely the preferred model explains the MOE.  
This conclusion is made based on how well the data points follow the diagonal line.  The 
residual by predicted plot shows that the assumption of heteroscedasticity, or an absence 
of a pattern in the residuals, is violated.  Prediction is not the purpose of this model.  The  
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purpose is gaining insight into the relative factor effects and their interactions.  Thus, this 
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Residual by Predicted Plot
Figure 13. Predicted versus actual Mean-Percent-Correct-Identifications and 
associated residual plot verifying the absence of pattern in the residuals. 
 
The preferred model in this study yields an R-squared of 0.96: 96% of the 
variability in the mean percent of correct identifications is explained by the critical 
factors identified in the model.  The analysis of variance section in Figure 13 shows that 
the model is highly significant.  This conclusion is based on the extremely low p-value 
for the F statistic. 
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Figure 14. The R-squared value and significance of the stepwise regression model. 
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The effect of each critical factor on the MOE is shown in Figure 15.  The absolute 
magnitude of the t-Ratio indicates the relative influence a factor has on the outcome of 
the MOE.  The 114.01 value for Distance Between Pairs of Towers [4] is the largest 
value in the table and, thus, has the most statistical significance in explaining the MOE.  
The Distance Between Pairs of Towers factor is categorical and takes on the value of  
2 km or 4 km.  This factor has a positively correlated relationship with the MOE.  When 
Distance Between Pairs of Towers is set at 4 km, the MOE value produced in the 
simulation increases.  This is contrasted with the second highest magnitude value of  
–22.88 for the Number of Role-players per Team.  This factor is a nonzero integer and is 
negatively correlated with the MOE (i.e., as Number of Role-players per Team increases, 
the MOE value decreases).  Inspection of the remaining t-Ratio values yield an 
understanding of how the factors influence the MOE.  The proportion of variance 
explained by each factor is shown in Figure 16.  Again, the positioning of the towers is 
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Figure 15. Scaled estimates of the preferred stepwise regression used in the study.  
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Figure 16. Sum of squares of the preferred stepwise regression used in the study.  The 
sum of squares column explains the proportion of variance explained by each factor in 
the stepwise regression model. 
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Figure 17 shows an interaction plot of factors included in the preferred regression 
model.  An interaction indicates that the change in the MOE caused by varying one 
parameter is dependent upon the value of another parameter.  In an interaction plot, the 
MOE is on the y-axis and the factors involved in the interaction are on the x-axis or 
appear as separate lines as indicated in the legend.  The trellis plot containing the 
interactions shows the high and low levels of the factor on the row and the trend in the 
MOE by changing the factor in the column.  For example, Figure 17 (box all the way to 
the right in the second row) shows the interaction between Role-player Stealth and Tower 
Slew Rate.  This graphic indicates:  When Role-player Stealth is very high, the Tower 
Slew Rate has only marginal effect on the MOE; however, when Stealth is low, 
































































































Figure 17. Interaction plots of four critical factors that determine the level of SA. 
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Figure 18 is a contour plot that reinforces the effect of the interaction between 
Tower Slew Rate and Role-player Stealth has on the MOE.  In this plot, the slower  
G-BOSS slews its field-of-regard, the less stealth is required to avoid detection.  The 
stealth level used by snipers and IED emplacers affects the MOE regardless of the  
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Figure 18. Contour plot of interaction between Tower Slew Rate and Role-player 
Stealth, and their effect on the MOE. 
2. Regression Trees 
 Regression trees are another effective tool used to analyze the relationship 
between factors and MOEs.  A regression tree is a recursive partition of the raw data into 
sets of inputs containing similar responses.  Partitioning of the data occurs successively, 
according to the optimal splitting value determined from all possible values of each 
available variable.  Figure 19 displays a recursive split of the data from 780 MANA runs 












































































































Figure 19. Regression tree split on the raw data by Mean-Percent-Correct-
Identifications of Correct Identifications. 
 
This analysis complements the regression analysis in the previous section.  The 
first split is made on Distance Between Pairs of Towers.  This is the single most 
significant factor identified.  The regression tree provides the optimal split point at 2 km 
and 4 km.  G-BOSS towers placed 4 km apart provide a mean percent of correctly 
identified role-players nearly two times greater than G-BOSS towers placed 2 km apart. 
The next most important factor is Role-player Stealth.  When G-BOSS towers are 
placed 4 km apart and a sniper or IED emplacer’s stealth is less than 0.93, the expected 
percent of correct identifications is 93%.  If Role-player Stealth is greater than or equal to 
0.93, then the percent of correct identifications drops to 77%.  Although the particular 
value of 0.93 does not translate directly to the real world, one of the key “uncontrollable 
Placement of the G-BOSS 
towers is the most significant 
factor associated with the 
Mean-Percent-Correct-Identified 
MOE. 
Larger MOE values 
associated with Distance 
Between Pairs of Towers is  
4 km. 
 37
factors” is highly significant.  This is a notable result.  Perhaps countermeasures to enemy 
stealth can offset this effect.  For example, training G-BOSS operators to a higher level of 
vigilance and detailed classification of “suspicious” behavior may be suitable 
countermeasures.  Other significant factors identified by the regression tree include: 
• Camera 2 P(Classification) 
o (best when greater than .29) 
• Camera 1 Classification Range 
o (best when greater than 127 model grid squares, which is roughly 
equivalent to 2.5 km) 
• Role-player Speed 
o (best when they are moving at speeds greater than 7/100 grid 
squares per time step, which is roughly equivalent to 1 km/hr) 
C. COC COORDINATION VERSUS STAND-ALONE COMPARISONS 
 This section examines whether the simulation results of a coordinated 
configuration of G-BOSS improved operational effectiveness.  This analysis is based on 
both MOEs.  The following comparisons are conducted: 
• Coordinated configuration of G-BOSS against stand-alone configuration 
without MSTAR (distance between towers is set at 2 km). 
• Coordinated configuration of G-BOSS against stand-alone configuration 
with MSTAR (distance between towers is set at 2 km). 
The MOE data does not fit a Normal distribution.  Thus, a nonparametric statistical 
technique is used.  The Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test is designed to test whether a 
particular sample came from a population with a specified mean or median  
(Conover, 1999). 
1. Coordinated versus Stand-Alone Configurations without MSTAR 
 This analysis is conducted as a hypothesis test.  The null hypothesis is that the 
differences between two independent populations of simulation data from a coordinated 
G-BOSS configuration and a stand-alone configuration have the same mean.  The 
alternative hypothesis is that the means are not equal.  The notation used for this test is: 
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Figures 20 and 21 show that without the presence of MSTAR, the means between the 
coordinated G-BOSS approach and the stand-alone G-BOSS configuration are not equal.  
There is evidence to reject the null hypothesis at a 0.05 or 0.10 level of significance.  This 
conclusion is based on the p-value (0.0001).  There is a statistically significant increase in 
performance between the networked configuration and the stand-alone configuration.  
This finding is due to an increase of approximately two percentage points between the 
two configurations.  The small difference between the two configurations is so small that 
it should not be considered a practical significant difference.  In other words, there is not 
enough evidence to deem the coordinated configuration more effective than the  










































































Figure 20. Wilcoxon SignedRank Test results for coordinated G-BOSS configuration 
against stand-alone G-BOSS configuration for the Mean-Percent-Correct-Identification 
MOE.  (No MSTAR) 
The Mean-Percent-Correct-
Identification MOE values for the 
two G-BOSS configurations 
differ by a very small margin.  



































Contingency Analysis of DetectIED By #Monitors
 
Figure 21. Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test results for coordinated G-BOSS configuration 
against stand-alone G-BOSS configuration for the Mean-IED-Detected MOE.   
(No MSTAR) 
2. Coordinated versus Stand-alone Configurations with MSTAR 
 This analysis is conducted as a hypothesis test in a similar manner: 
_ _ _
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Figures 22 and 23 show that with the presence of MSTAR, the means between the 
coordinated G-BOSS approach and the stand-alone G-BOSS configuration are not equal.  
Thus, there is enough evidence to reject the null hypothesis at a 0.05 or 0.10 level of 
significance.  This conclusion is based on the low p-value (0.0001).  There is both a 
The Mean-IED-Detected 
MOE values for the G-BOSS 
configurations are different, 
but the MOE values are not 
statistically different. 
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statistically and practically significant increase in performance with the networked 
configuration as compared to the stand-alone configuration.  The performance with the 
networked configuration increases by nearly 25% (from approximately 47% correct 
classifications to about 70% correct classifications).  This increase is significant enough 
to deem the coordinated configuration more effective than the stand-alone configuration 
































































Figure 22. Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test results for coordinated G-BOSS configuration 










Identification MOE values for the 
two G-BOSS configurations differ 
by a large margin.  The differences 










































Contingency Analysis of DetectIED By #Monitors
 
Figure 23. Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test results for coordinated G-BOSS configuration 
against stand-alone G-BOSS configuration for the Mean-IED-Detected MOE.   
(With MSTAR) 
The Mean-IED-Detected MOE 
values for the G-BOSS 
configurations are very different.  




This research set out to determine how Marines deployed now can best employ  
G-BOSS.  An operational test of G-BOSS conducted by MCOTEA is the basis for the 
simulation model created in this study.  This thesis produced a comparative, quantitative 
analysis of G-BOSS employment TTPs and the critical factors that determine the level of 
SA provided by G-BOSS.  The results of this thesis provide insights to enhance 
operational effectiveness of G-BOSS.  Furthermore, the simulation built for this research 
can serve as the foundation for many additional studies. 
A. ANALYSIS INSIGHTS 
 The insights gained in this analysis are: 
• The positioning of the towers is the most critical factor associated with 
enhancing the operational effectiveness of G-BOSS.  A distance of 4 km 
between G-BOSS towers results in a proportion of correct identifications 
of 0.91 while a distance of 2 km results in a proportion of 0.53.  When  
G-BOSS is employed in open terrain, more dispersion results in  
better performance. 
• The stealth of the role-players has a significant effect on the proportion of 
correct identifications.  This result is intuitive and helps validate the 
model, since snipers and IED emplacers tend to use stealth to mask their 
hostile acts or intent.  Increased training of G-BOSS operators’ level of 
vigilance is a countermeasure to mitigate enemy stealth. 
• The interaction between tower slew rate and stealth of the role-players is 
significant.  A faster G-BOSS slew rate provides a greater proportion of 
correct identifications when role-players’ stealth is low.  When  
role-players’ stealth is high, a low proportion of correct identifications is 
achieved, regardless of tower slew rate.  Recall that tower slew rate is the 
model’s surrogate for the speed at which G-BOSS operators can observe a 
field-of-regard. 
• Without the presence of MSTAR, the coordinated G-BOSS configuration 
produces a slightly larger proportion of correct identifications than the 
stand-alone G-BOSS configuration.  The coordinated G-BOSS 
configuration results in an overall proportion of correct identification of 
0.51, while the stand-alone G-BOSS configuration results in an overall 
proportion of correct identification of 0.49.  The results of the comparison 
between the G-BOSS configurations are not practically significant.  This 
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is based on the marginal increase of approximately two percentage points 
between the coordinated G-BOSS configuration and the stand-alone G-
BOSS configuration.  Further, this finding answers the question of 
underutilization:  Stand-alone employment of G-BOSS is nearly as 
effective as a coordinated employment of G-BOSS without MSTAR. 
• With MSTAR, the coordinated G-BOSS configuration produces a 
significantly larger proportion of correct identifications than what the 
stand-alone configuration produces.  The coordinated G-BOSS 
configuration results in an overall proportion of correct identifications of 
0.71 and the stand-alone configuration results in an overall proportion of 
correct identifications of 0.47.  This result is practically and statistically 
significant.  MSTAR facilitates the detection of more agents.  MSTAR 
coupled with data fusion at the COC affords commanders an  
enhanced capability. 
• The emplacement of the IED was detected in 76% of all of the simulation 
excursions conducted (which varied 13 factors associated with GBOSS or 
the role-players).  This is promising since G-BOSS’s mission is to counter 
the threat of IEDs. 
B. FOLLOW-ON WORK 
 The following is a list of follow on research of value stemming from this research: 
• Additional validation and comparison of the MANA simulation results 
with the results of MCOTEA’s live experiment. 
• Further research into the utility of using simulation to develop synthetic 
operational experiences in new doctrine and tactics. 
• Human factors study on how the vigilance of G-BOSS operators affects 
the level of SA provided by G-BOSS. 
• Application of the findings in this thesis on enhancing the operational 
effectiveness of G-BOSS in an urban environment. 
• Research into the operational effectiveness provided by G-BOSS when 
integrated with various organic assets (UAS, C2 assets, and Fire  
Support Systems). 
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